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
**DCI Security Committee**

*A Study of  
Harassments and Provocations*

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## FOREWORD

This study documents various types of harassments and provocations against U.S. military and civilian personnel traveling in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and other areas of the world. The cases in the study illustrate operational procedures used by hostile intelligence services. These cases were compiled from input by members of the DCI Security Committee.

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## INTRODUCTION

The initial DCI Security Committee study on harassments and provocations was published in 1967 and updated in 1974. The following compilation of incidents and events which have occurred since 1974 is intended to aid member agencies in the preparation of defensive briefings.

The incidents and events cited in this study occurred mainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The two incidents cited in Africa and the one in India were Soviet-related. No information on Chinese activities of this nature have been reported as of this update.

The definitions of harassment and provocation are given below:

**HARASSMENT:** Any action taken against a person or group to prevent or delay the achievement of objectives. The action may be of an inconsequential or annoying nature escalating to one of major proportions. The harassment may also be a prelude to a provocation.

**PROVOCATION:** Any action taken against a person, group, or intelligence service to induce self-damaging action. The provocation is frequently the prelude to a recruitment attempt or official action by the state, including arrest, imprisonment, or expulsion.

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## SOVIET UNION

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The USSR encourages tourism and other travel for both economic and political reasons. It obviously does not wish to promote the image of a police state by subjecting visitors to the repressive measures it applies to its own population. However, the Soviets are hypersensitive to espionage activities, or the suspicion thereof, and fear that the Soviet people will be infected with Western ideas and values through contact with foreigners. The Soviet state security apparatus is specifically geared to prevent these perceived threats and for this reason subjects foreign visitors to vastly more scrutiny than they would receive in any non-Communist country.

There have, of course, been instances of harassments and provocations, but these are miniscule in number relative to the total number of foreigners visiting the USSR each year. In cases cited, harassment and provocation attempts were perpetrated because the KGB believed, rightly or wrongly, that the target was engaged in subversive activities or could be coerced into intelligence cooperation. The KGB does not conduct such activities at random, but rather on the basis of information it has developed through observation of the target's behavior and activities. Military travelers tend to be more closely scrutinized than civilian travelers. This extra attention has been focused on military tourists even in cases when their passports and visas did not indicate their affiliation with the armed forces.

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For nearly twenty years, the United States has been sending traveling exhibitions into the Soviet Union under the auspices of the United States Information Agency (USIA). USIA officers provide the executive direction to the exhibitions while American contract employees serve as the actual exhibit guides. These guides are usually college graduates or graduate students who have majored in Russian studies and who eagerly seek out this unique opportunity to increase their language skills, steep themselves in Soviet culture, and experience "Russian soul." Because the guides are as curious about the host country and its people as the local citizens are about the guides, there is generally a great deal of interaction and social contact between the guides and Soviet citizens. This, of course, leads to varying degrees of surveillance and control on the part of the KGB. In some locales, KGB coverage is tight and control over the population visiting the exhibit is very strict. In other instances, the relationship between the guides and the local populace is reasonably open and friendly, with little evidence of any close KGB scrutiny.

The following cases provide detailed descriptions of the various types of harassments and provocations used by the KGB against foreign visitors in the Soviet Union.

#### Case 1

One American, invited to the USSR in 1976 to conduct a training program, was subject to so much harassment that he cut his trip short and returned to the United States. He was required to pay an extra fee for transporting his luggage and given extremely shabby hotel accommodations. His interpreter/escort arranged a cocktail party followed by a dinner and had the entire cost charged to his account. The escort became increasingly uncooperative and difficult, and the relationship between the two degenerated steadily. Alcoholic beverages were pressed on the American. He thought he was possibly drugged on more than one occasion. The heat in his hotel room was turned off, and he was bothered by frequent telephone calls during the night, although no one answered when he lifted the receiver. He once awoke to find a woman sitting on his bed. His personal effects were searched and his diary stolen. When he complained about his treatment, he was accused of insulting the Soviet Union and threatened with immediate expulsion. When he decided to leave, however, his escort placed various obstacles in his way. He finally had to make arrangements for departure himself. The American has no explanation for the way in which he was

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treated, other than possible Soviet suspicion because he had hand-carried and mailed some letters given to him by Soviet trainees in the United States.

## Case 2

In mid-January 1976 a USIA guide experienced a contrived incident in Leningrad. The guide had a date to meet two Soviets with whom she had become acquainted through another visiting American. The guide visited the theatre with the two Soviets on several previous occasions, and nothing unusual had occurred. One night they agreed to have dinner together at the Baku Restaurant, and planned to meet at the "Dom Knigi" (a bookstore) at 7:30 p.m. Her friends were late, and as she waited for them, she was engaged in conversation by a young Soviet who approached and addressed her by full name. The young man stated that he knew her from having seen her at the exhibit. The American's friends arrived at 8:00 p.m. and the three walked to the Baku Restaurant. After being seated, they became involved in a conversation with three young Soviets at the next table, one of whom said he was celebrating his birthday. The guide said that the three individuals had assumed she was Russian, and had expressed much surprise when informed she was an American. They had several drinks during dinner, but she limited her intake because she was tired. Her Soviet female dinner companion, on the other hand, was drinking quite heavily, which appeared unusual to the guide, who had never seen her do so before. At one point during the evening, she accompanied the woman to the restroom in an attempt to sober her up; however, the girl continued to drink when returning to the table and ultimately passed out. The girl's actions and excessive drinking attracted the attention of other restaurant patrons and to the American's embarrassment, a woman approached and asked her to take the girl home. The USIA guide decided to leave, and after telling the girl's husband to take his wife home, she left the restaurant. One of the men who had occupied the next table offered to walk her to the bus, but as she walked out of the restaurant she saw a waiting taxi. The driver refused to take her to her hotel. While she was attempting to persuade him to take her to the hotel, a disturbance began adjacent to the vehicle. Noting that a fight was in progress, she exited the taxi to take a bus. As she was making her way through the crowd, she was seized by two militiamen who propelled her along the street to a waiting van. They ignored her protests that she was an American and had taken no part in the disturbance. Two people in the

crowd were photographing her as she was taken to the van. Upon entering the van, she found several other militiamen and two additional Russians, one of whom was the young Soviet from the adjoining table at the restaurant. The USIA guide was taken to a house and brought into a basement room filled with military personnel and individuals in civilian clothes. The young man from the restaurant suggested that for the sum of 25 rubles, it would be possible to bribe one of the militiamen into releasing them, if she would agree to pose as the young man's wife. That offer was declined. She was held for one-and-a-half hours during which time she was questioned and accused of being intoxicated and creating a disturbance. Although the guide attempted to walk out a number of times, she was turned back as soon as she reached the door. Eventually her passport was returned and she was asked to sign a statement listing six complaints against her before being released. The only complaints which she later recalled were: being drunk, impersonating an Estonian, and causing a riot. This case shows how the Soviets use staged incidents to detain and question Americans.

## Case 3

An American couple with special interest in Soviet Jews visited the USSR in 1975. They encountered delays in getting their visas and were told upon arrival in Moscow that no hotel rooms were available. They had to take a night train to a provincial city. Nothing noteworthy occurred as they toured several cities, making contacts with Jews in each city, although they were sometimes under obvious surveillance. Finally in one city, they were abruptly accosted in their hotel lobby by three men who took them to an office and interrogated them for approximately eight hours. They were told that they faced up to five years imprisonment after being accused of being foreign agents and document smugglers. Their denials and requests for contact with American authorities were met with scorn and laughter. The interrogators grew increasingly impatient and pressured the couple to write and sign a statement outlining their alleged hostile actions. When the wife was told that her husband would be moved elsewhere, she prepared a factual statement about their activities since arriving in the Soviet Union. The interrogation ended almost as suddenly as it began. The couple was rushed to a railroad station and put on a train leaving the country. The three Soviets, who never formally identified themselves as KGB officers, confiscated several hundred dollars worth of unused travel vouchers during the interrogation.

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